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INTRODUCTION
The story of Joe Camel is a tragic one. 1 Born and orphaned in
Europe in 1974, 2 Joe worked his way up the economic ladder to
financial success. Joe’s big break came in 1988 when the R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company selected Joe to become the brand’s
mascot, the “face” of Camel Cigarettes. 3 Featured on the front
panel of Camel Cigarette packages 4—as well as various billboards,
advertisements, catalogues, and promotional merchandise like

1

The following story is a dramatization. The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company began
using Joe Camel, a whimsical caricaturized camel, as a marketing campaign in 1988. See
Stuart Elliot, The Media Business: Advertising; Camel’s Success and Controversy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/business/themedia-business-advertising-camel-s-success-and-controversy.html [hereinafter Elliot,
Camel’s Success and Controversy]. However, despite its widespread success, the Joe
Camel campaign was retired in 1997 amid great controversy—a large consensus believed
Joe Camel was intended to, and did, target and encourage children to smoke. See Stuart
Elliot, Joe Camel, a Giant in Tobacco Marketing, Is Dead at 23, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/11/business/joe-camel-a-giant-intobacco-marketing-is-dead-at-23.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm [hereinafter Elliot, Dead
at 23]; Elliot, Camel’s Success and Controversy, supra.
2
See Elliot, Camel’s Success and Controversy, supra note 1.
3
See id.
4
See Joe Camel Ignites Fury by Appearing on Cigarette Pack, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 7, 1994, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/351820/JOE-CAMELIGNITES-FURY-BY-APPEARING-ON-CIGARETTE-PACK.html?pg=all.
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caps, t-shirts, and lighters 5—Joe was catapulted into the public
spotlight and instant stardom. In fact, according to the American
Medical Association, at the height of his career, Joe Camel rivaled
the iconic Mickey Mouse in recognition among six-year-old
children. 6 However, in 1997, just nine years after beginning at
Camel Cigarettes, Joe died of lung cancer at the young age of
twenty-three. 7 Joe was not a smoker, but all of the executives at
R.J. Reynolds were. 8
Unfortunately, Joe’s story is not uncommon among Americans.
“Cigarette smoking kills an estimated 443,000 Americans,”
including children, each year. 9 In fact, in the United States,
cigarette smoking is the foremost cause of preventable death and
disease, 10 resulting in more annual deaths than “AIDS, alcohol,
illegal drug use, homicide, suicide, and motor vehicle crashes
combined.” 11 For instance, “[a] consensus exists within the
scientific and medical communities that tobacco products are
inherently dangerous and cause cancer, heart disease, and other
serious adverse health effects.” 12 Furthermore, the negative health
5

See Elliot, Dead at 23, supra note 1; Elliot, Camel’s Success and Controversy, supra
note 1.
6
See Paul M. Fischer et al, Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years,
266(22) JAMA 3145, 3147–48 (1991), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
documentStore/m/z/w/mzw84f00/Smzw84f00.pdf.
7
See Elliot, Dead at 23, supra note 1.
8
This is a dramatization. There is neither evidence nor intended truth surrounding
this statement.
9
See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg.
69,524, 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule] (FDA proposing thirty-six graphic labels and eight textual warnings for
public comment) (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, SmokingAttributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United
States, 2000–2004, 57(45) MMWR 1226–1228 (Nov. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5745a3.htm).
10
See id. at 69,526 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/smokingconsequences/index.html).
11
See id. (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Surveillance for Cancers
Associated with Tobacco Use—United States, 1999–2004, 57(SS08) MMWR 1–33 (Sept.
5, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5708a1.htm).
12
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1224 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777 (2009) (codified at 21
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effects of smoking are not limited to smokers, but also plague
nonsmokers who inhale secondhand smoke. 13 However, despite
the fact that smoking cessation has been shown to prevent and
even reverse these adverse health effects to a certain extent, 14
approximately one-fifth of Americans are cigarette smokers 15—
perhaps partly due to the consensus within the scientific and
medical communities that “[n]icotine is an addictive drug.” 16
Accordingly, in 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Smoking Act”), granting
the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”), for the first time, the
authority to regulate cigarettes. 17 The Smoking Act was in
response to scientific research indicating that current cigarette
warning labels are ineffective. 18 Specifically, after observing the
adoption of pictorial cigarette warnings worldwide, 19 the FDA
concluded that larger prominent warnings, with pictures, “are more
likely to be noticed, communicate information about health risks to
consumers, and reinforce intentions among tobacco users who
want to quit.” 20
U.S.C § 387 Note (2011) [hereinafter Smoking Act]) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,527–29 (collecting
scientific evidence).
13
See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,527 (citing Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, supra note 9).
14
See id. at 69,529.
15
See id. at 69,526 (collecting scientific evidence).
16
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1224 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting the Smoking Act § 2(3),
123 Stat. at 1777 (codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,528–29 (collecting scientific
evidence).
17
Smoking Act § 3(1), § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
18
See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529–31.
19
See id. at 69,525, 69,531–33. “Countries/jurisdictions that have implemented
pictorial warning requirements for tobacco packaging include: Australia; Belgium;
Brazil; Brunei; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Cook Islands; Djibouti; Egypt; Hong Kong;
India; Iran; Jordan; Latvia; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Mongolia; New Zealand;
Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Romania; Singapore; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand;
Turkey; United Kingdom; Uruguay; and Venezuela.” Id. at 69,525 n.4.
“Countries/jurisdictions with pending requirements include: France; Guernsey, Honduras;
Malta; Norway; Philippines; and Spain.” Id.
20
Id. at 69,529 (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Warnings
on Tobacco Products—Worldwide, 2007, 58(19) MMWR 528–29 (May 22, 2009)
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Pursuant to the Smoking Act, the FDA promulgated the
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements
(“Final Rule”) in June 2011. 21 The Final Rule marked the first
change to cigarette warnings in the United States in over twentyfive years. 22 Unlike previous warnings, the Final Rule requires
that one of nine graphic images, in conjunction with nine new
textual warnings and a “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number,
appear on all cigarette packages. 23 The Final Rule’s nine new
warnings include graphic images such as “a man exhaling cigarette
smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his throat” and “a plume of
cigarette smoke enveloping an infant.” 24 Furthermore, unlike
previous warnings, the Final Rule’s warnings are not to appear on
the sides of tobacco packages, but instead purport to cover the top
fifty percent of the front and back panels of all cigarette packs. 25
Although the Final Rule was supposed to take effect in September
2012, 26 challenges to its constitutionality have halted its
applicability.
As of this Note’s publication, four courts (“Four Decisions”)
have addressed whether the government’s requiring graphic
warning labels on cigarette packaging violates the tobacco
companies’ freedom of speech protected under the First

available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5819a3.htm); see also id.
at 69,531–35 (collecting scientific evidence).
21
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,628–29 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) [hereinafter
Final Rule].
22
See id.; Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529; Kristin M. Sempeles, Comment, The
FDA’s Attempt to Scare the Smoke out of You: Has the FDA gone too far with the Nine
Cigarette Warning Labels?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 223, 223 (2012).
23
Compare Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,648–57, and 36,681, with Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2200, 2201–03 (1984)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)) [hereinafter CSEA].
24
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d
41 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also infra Part I.A.3.
25
Compare Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,674, with CSEA § 4(a), and Proposed Rule
75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529; see also Stephanie J. Bennett, Comment, Paternalistic
Manipulation Through Pictorial Warnings: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech,
and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 81 MISS. L.J. 1909, 1912
(2012).
26
See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628–29.
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Amendment. 27 In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United
States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding
that the new size and placement requirements and the inclusion of
graphic images on cigarette warning labels are constitutional. 28
Furthermore, though the tobacco industry appealed the Sixth
Circuit’s ruling following a denied request for rehearing and
rehearing en banc, 29 the Supreme Court subsequently denied the
appellants’ petition for certiorari. 30 However, in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration, the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the FDA’s nine
selected images render the Final Rule’s cigarette warning labels
unconstitutional. 31 Thus, the D.C. Circuit vacated the FDA’s Final
Rule and remanded it to the agency. 32
Following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, and a subsequent denied
request for rehearing and rehearing en banc, 33 the FDA declined to

27

See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012);
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266
(D.D.C. 2011); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D.
Ky. 2010).
28
Compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–565, with Commonwealth Brands, 678 F.
Supp. 2d at 512.
29
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996
(2013) (No. 12–521), available at http://www.natocentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
11/Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari-to-U.S.-Supreme-Court.pdf; Brent Kendall & Jennifer
Corbett Dooren, Tobacco Industry’s Challenge to Law Requiring Graphic Labels is
Rejected, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4127887323735604578438594078101904.html.
30
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied, Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 1996 (2013) (No. 12–521); Kendall & Dooren, Tobacco Industry’s Challenge to Law
Requiring Graphic Labels is Rejected, supra note 29.
31
Compare Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208, with Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
32
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222.
33
See Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied, R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063 (D.C. Cir.
2012), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf_assets/order%20
denying%20en%20banc.pdf; Gavin Broady, DC Circ. Won’t Rehear Tobacco Warning
Label Case, LAW360 (Dec. 5, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/399045/
dc-circ-won-t-rehear-tobacco-warning-label-case; see also Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin.,
Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 2012 WL 4844135.
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appeal to the Supreme Court. 34 Instead, the FDA intends to
conduct additional research and create new graphic images for
inclusion on cigarette warnings labels. 35 In creating these new
labels, the FDA may look to the Four Decisions for guidance in
determining the constitutional parameters for selecting new
graphic images. Additionally, future courts will look to the Four
Decisions in resolving any prospective challenges to the
constitutionality of the FDA’s redesigned warnings. However,
these cases provide little guidance on the issue as both districts and
both circuits are respectively split and employ differing
constitutional standards of review. 36 Furthermore, each respective
circuit is internally split 2–1 in both its ruling and adopted
constitutional standard of review. 37
34

See Letter from Attorney General Holder to Speaker Boehner (Mar. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.regulationonline.net/chapters/reg-ch7/fda-warnings (outlining the
FDA’s intended course of action); Steve Almasy, FDA Changes Course on Graphic
Warning Labels for Cigarettes, CNN (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/03/19/health/fda-graphic-tobacco-warnings.
35
See Letter from Attorney General Holder to Speaker Boehner, supra note 34
(outlining the FDA’s intended course of action); Almasy, FDA Changes Course on
Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarettes, supra note 34.
36
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the
graphic warning labels unconstitutional); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 561–65 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying “rational-basis” review to hold the
graphic warning labels constitutional); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 276–277
(applying “strict scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels unconstitutional);
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21, 541 (W.D.
Ky. 2010) (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels
constitutional). See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
37
Compare Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (majority applying “intermediate scrutiny” to
hold the graphic warning labels unconstitutional), with id. at 1222–23, 1237–38 (Rogers,
J., dissenting) (dissent applying “rational-basis” review to hold the graphic warning
labels constitutional), id. at 1237–38 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissent holding the graphic
warning labels also withstand “intermediate scrutiny”), and id. at 1234, 1236–38 (Rogers,
J., dissenting) (dissent applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” telephone number unconstitutional); compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–65
(majority applying “rational-basis” review to hold the graphic warning labels
constitutional), with id. at 522–31 (Clay, J., dissenting), 568 (dissent merging
“intermediate scrutiny” and “rational-basis” reviews to hold the graphic warning labels,
excluding the size and position requirements, unconstitutional). See generally Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 626; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705.
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Accordingly, in an attempt to clarify the constitutionality of the
FDA’s previous and impending graphic cigarette warning labels,
this Note will analyze and attempt to resolve the Four Decisions’
divergent holdings regarding the Smoking Act and the FDA’s
Final Rule. Specifically, Part I of this Note will discuss the
legislative background surrounding the Smoking Act and the Final
Rule, as well as provide an overview of the legal background
concerning the free Speech and commercial speech doctrines.
Next, Part II will outline the current circuit split between the Sixth
and D.C. Circuits, and identify the differing constitutional
standards of review the Four Decisions employ.
Contrary to the Four Decisions, 38 Part III will then propose that
a “rational-basis” and “intermediate scrutiny” hybrid is the
applicable standard of review, and, in an abundance of caution,
include an analysis of the Final Rule’s constitutionality under
“strict scrutiny,” “intermediate scrutiny,” and “rational-basis”
reviews. Finally, this Note will conclude that, except for its nine
textual warnings, the Final Rule fails to pass constitutional muster
under all three constitutional standards of review, and will suggest
how new graphic warning labels can circumvent the Final Rule’s
constitutional pitfalls.
Thus, this Note will conclude that if a picture is worth a
thousand words, then the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels are
worth a thousand words that violate free speech.

38

See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the
graphic warning labels unconstitutional); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509, 561–65 (applying
“rational-basis” review to hold the graphic warning labels constitutional); Reynolds, 845
F. Supp. 2d 266, 276–277 (applying “strict scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels
unconstitutional); Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21, 541 (applying
“intermediate scrutiny” to hold the graphic warning labels constitutional). See generally
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Background—The FDA’s Attempt to Foster
Smoking Abstinence
1. Current Cigarette Warning Labels
In response to the Surgeon General’s landmark report on
smoking and health in 1964, 39 Congress passed the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. 40 This legislation
required, for the first time, that a printed warning appear on all
cigarette packages to warn consumers of the potential hazards of
cigarette smoking. 41 The warning, which was required to be
conspicuous and legible, was displayed in small print on one of the
side panels of cigarette packages. 42
The warning read,
“CAUTION: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health.” 43 This language appeared on all cigarette packages sold
from January 1, 1966, through October 31, 1970. 44
Subsequently, in 1969, Congress passed the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act, 45 which slightly modified the warning
statements on cigarette packs. 46 The new warning language read,
“Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.” 47 This label appeared on
39

See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,254, 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (“In 1964, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service
issued the landmark report titled ‘Smoking and Health,’ which comprehensively assessed
the available scientific evidence relating to the health effects of cigarette smoking . . . .”);
see also id. at 69,529. The report concluded that cigarette smoking is a health hazard of
sufficient importance in the United States, and that appropriate remedial action was
warranted. See id. at 69,525.
40
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (1970)) [hereinafter FCLAA]; see
also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529.
41
FCLAA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,525.
42
See FCLAA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529.
43
FCLAA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,529–30.
44
See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
45
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (2006)) [hereinafter PHCSA].
46
Id. § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
47
PHCSA § 4; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
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all cigarette packages sold in the United States from November 1,
1970, through October 11, 1985. 48
Finally, in 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act of 1984, 49 again modifying the cigarette warnings to
their present state. 50 This legislation required that four new
rotational 51 health warnings be placed on all cigarette packages
and cigarette advertisements. 52 The four warnings read: (1)
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate
Pregnancy;” (2) “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting
Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health;” (3)
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth and Low
Birth Weight;” and (4) “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:
Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.” 53 These are the
warning labels currently required on cigarette packages. 54
2. The Family Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
In light of the superiority of international pictorial warning
labels over America’s textual warning labels, 55 Congress passed
the Family Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Smoking Act”)
in 2009. 56 The Smoking Act, for the first time, granted the FDA
the authority to regulate the manufacture and sale of tobacco
products in order “to promote cessation [of tobacco use] to reduce
48

See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (1994).
50
15 U.S.C. § 1333; see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
51
The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act mandated that the four warnings be
rotated quarterly in alternating sequence to prevent the warnings from becoming stale. 15
U.S.C. § 1333(c)(2); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
52
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), § 1333(b)(1); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at
69,530.
53
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
54
See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,530.
55
See id. at 69,531–35 (collecting scientific evidence).
56
Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified in part at 21 U.S.C § 301
Note, § 331 Note, § 333 Note, § 387, §§ 387(a)–(u), § 387(a)–(1), § 387(c) Note, § 391,
§§ 392 and Note, §§ 393–399(a) (2011), and codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333 and
Note, § 4402 Note (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
49
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disease risk and the social costs associated with tobacco–related
diseases.” 57
Under the Smoking Act, all cigarette packages must include
one of the following nine new textual warnings: (1) “Cigarettes are
addictive;” (2) “Tobacco smoke can harm your children;” (3)
“Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease;” (4) “Cigarettes cause
cancer;” (5) “Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease;” (6)
“Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby;” (7)
“Smoking can kill you;” (8) “Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung
disease in nonsmokers;” or (9) “Quitting smoking now
greatly reduces serious risks in your health.” 58 Additionally, the
Smoking Act specifies that the labels “shall comprise the top 50
percent of the front and rear panels of the package” and that the
word “WARNING” should appear in capital letters in seventeenpoint font. 59 Finally, the Smoking Act requires that “color
graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking”
must accompany the textual warnings. 60
3. The Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements Rule
Pursuant to the Smoking Act, the FDA submitted a proposed
rule for public comment on November 12, 2010, 61 and
subsequently published a Final Rule on June 22 2011. 62 Under the
Final Rule, one of nine graphic images is required to appear on
all cigarette packages, along with one of the Smoking Act’s nine
57

Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 520 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting the Smoking Act § 3(9) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Smoking Act § 3(1) (codified at 21 U.S.C §
387 Note (2011)); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d
1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
58
Smoking Act § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
59
Id. at § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & Supp.
2009)).
60
Id. at § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2006 & Supp.
2009)).
61
Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §
1141 (2011)).
62
Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141
(2011)).
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new specified textual warnings 63 and a “1–800–QUIT–NOW”
telephone number. 64 The nine different warning labels are to
rotate in publication according to an agency-approved plan. 65
The Final Rule’s nine graphic warnings include color images
of: (1) “a man exhaling cigarette smoke through
a tracheotomy hole in his throat,” paired with the text “Warning:
Cigarettes are addictive;” 66

(2) “a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving
a kiss from his or her mother,” paired with the text “Warning:
Tobacco Smoke Can Harm Your Children;” 67

63

Id. at 36,648–57.
Id. at 36,681.
65
See Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1776, 1844 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1333(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009)); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United
States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 270 (D.D.C. 2011).
66
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d
41 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36,657; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (May 15,
2013) (last visited July 29, 2013) (displaying the nine graphic images),
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm.
67
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,659; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
64
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(3) “a pair of diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy lungs,”
paired with the text “Warning: Cigarettes cause fatal lung
disease;” 68

(4) “a diseased mouth afflicted with what appears to be
cancerous lesions,” paired with the text “Warning: Cigarettes cause
cancer;” 69

68

Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,660; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
69
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,662; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
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(5) “a man breathing into an oxygen mask,” paired with the
text “Warning: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease;” 70

(6) “a stylized cartoon (as opposed to a staged photograph) of a
premature baby in an incubator,” paired with the text “Warning:
Smoking During Pregnancy Can Harm Your Baby;” 71

70

Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,664; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
71
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,665; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
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(7) “a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and featuring
what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the middle of
his torso,” paired with the text “Warning: Smoking can kill you;” 72

(8) “a woman weeping uncontrollably,” paired with the text
“Warning: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in
nonsmokers;” 73

72

Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,665; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66
(displaying the nine graphic images).
73
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,667; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
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and (9) “a man wearing a t-shirt that features a ‘no smoking’
symbol and the words ‘I Quit,’” paired with the text “Warning:
Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risk to your
health.” 74

The FDA selected these nine graphic images due to their
superior salience (i.e., noticeability and readability) and ability to
depict the negative health consequences of smoking. 75
Furthermore, the FDA believes that these images are consistent
74

Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 36,669; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 66 (displaying
the nine graphic images).
75
See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,648–57, 36,637–38, 36,696; Proposed Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,531 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)).
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with the types of pictorial warnings required or developed by other
international governments, such as Canada, the European Union,
and Australia, whose “sets of warnings include a balance of
images, some more visually disturbing than others.” 76 The FDA
also believes that “including a varied set of warnings is consistent
with the existing scientific literature concerning the effectiveness
of graphic health warnings.” 77
The Final Rule’s new graphic warnings were scheduled to take
effect for all cigarette packages manufactured on or after
September 2012, 78 but challenges to its constitutionality have
halted its applicability. 79 Though the FDA intends to conduct
additional research and redesign the Final Rule’s graphic
warnings, 80 this Note will, nevertheless, proceed with an
evaluation of the Rule’s present constitutionality; such will aid the
FDA and future courts in determining the constitutionality of
prospective graphic cigarette warning labels.
B. Legal Background—The Free Speech and Commercial Speech
Doctrines
Both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking are “complementary components of the broader concept
of individual freedom of mind” protected under the First
Amendment. 81 This protection includes any governmental attempt
“to compel individuals to express certain views” 82 or “to subsidize
speech to which they object.” 83 Additionally, this protection
“applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement,

76

Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,534.
Id.
78
See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628.
79
See discussion, infra Part II.
80
See Letter from Attorney General Holder to Speaker Boehner, supra note 34
(outlining the FDA’s intended course of action); Almasy, FDA Changes Course on
Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarettes, supra note 34.
81
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
82
Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977)).
83
Id. (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410–11 (2001)).
77
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but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.” 84
“This holds true whether individuals” 85 or “corporations are being
compelled to speak.” 86 Furthermore, this First Amendment
protection also applies to commercial speech, including tobacco
advertising, 87 with “commercial illustrations [being] entitled to the
[same] First Amendment protections afforded to verbal
commercial speech.” 88
However, there are instances when the government is permitted
to infringe on one’s First Amendment rights. 89 This is true
particularly for commercial speech, which the Supreme Court held
is subject to less robust protection than other forms of speech—
such as religious or political speech. 90 In determining whether the
government is permitted to infringe on one’s freedom of speech,
the Supreme Court continuously acknowledges the importance of
balancing the First Amendment with the public’s right to be

84
Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 573–74 (1995)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
85
Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
86
Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16
(1986) (plurality opinion)).
87
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 527–28 (2001) (“the First
Amendment protects the [tobacco advertisements] [] of petitioners”); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–762 (1976)
(“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”) (citations omitted);
Sempeles, supra note 22, at 239 n.155 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 500 n.10 (1996) (“[E]ven though ‘commercial’ speech is involved, such a
regulation strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
88
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
89
See id.
90
See id. at 651 (“Ohio has not attempted to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion’”); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
562–63 (1980) (citation omitted) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”); Reynolds,
696 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)
(listing a “handful of ‘narrow and well-understood exceptions’ to the general rule that
content-based speech regulations—including compelled speech—are subject to strict
scrutiny”)).
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informed. 91 Commercial speech can help educate consumers by
facilitating the greatest possible dissemination of crucial
information. 92 Compelled commercial disclosures, in particular,
enable the government to warn unsuspecting consumers about the
potential dangers of various products. 93
Accordingly, in addressing these countervailing interests,
courts utilize one of three constitutional standards of review to
determine whether the government’s infringement on free speech
violates the First Amendment. 94 Under the most-exacting Wooley
“strict scrutiny” standard, the government must demonstrate that
“the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.” 95 Under Central Hudson’s “intermediate
scrutiny” standard, courts must determine whether: (1) the
regulation counteracts speech that is not misleading and concerns a
lawful activity; (2) the “governmental interest is substantial;” (3)
“the regulation directly advances” the government’s interest; and
(4) “the regulation is no more than necessary to serve” the
government’s interest. 96
Finally, under the least-exacting
Zauderer “rational-basis” standard, the government’s regulation is
constitutional if it is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers,” 97 and is not “unjustified or
unduly burdensome.” 98
91

See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996) (weighing the
possibility that “a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying
governmental policy”) (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9); Sempeles, supra
note 22, at 239 (citation omitted).
92
See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1915 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62).
93
See id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641).
94
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 705 (1977).
95
Bennett, supra note 25, at 1917 (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
96
Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97
Id. at 1916–17 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 653 n.15 (holding the disclosure requirements not unduly
burdensome under “rational-basis” review). But see Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v.
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 525, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting) (majority
opinion differing from the dissent in holding that compelled disclosures may be
unjustified or unduly burdensome under “rational-basis” review).
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Though these three constitutional standards of review appear to
provide straightforward guidance in evaluating the constitutionality
of governmental regulations compelling commercial speech
disclosures, there has been much confusion and disagreement
among courts in determining when a given standard applies. 99
II. CONFLICT: THE SIXTH AND D.C. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Sixth Circuit Employs Zauderer’s “Rational-Basis”
Standard to Hold the Smoking Act’s Graphic Cigarette
Warning Labels Constitutional
In Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, six tobacco
companies 100 brought suit in the Western District of Kentucky
against the United States of America and others. 101 The suit
alleged that provisions of the Smoking Act 102 violate the tobacco
companies’ freedom of speech protected under the First
99

See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (dividing 2–1 over what commercial speech standard to apply); Disc. Tobacco
City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (dividing 2–1 over what
commercial speech standard to apply); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food
and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47–49 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to
analyze the constitutionality of the Final Rule’s graphic cigarette warning labels);
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21, 541 (W.D.
Ky. 2010) (applying Central Hudson to analyze the constitutionality of the Smoking
Act’s graphic cigarette warning labels). See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706
(1977).
100
The six tobacco companies included Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc.,
Lorillard Tobacco Company, National Tobacco Company, L.P., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Commonwealth Brands, Inc., and Conwood Company, LLC (currently known
as American Snuff Company, LLC). See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 509, 521 n.2;
Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
101
678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010). The tobacco companies also brought suit
against the FDA, Margaret Hamburg (Commissioner of the FDA), and Kathleen Sebelius
(Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services). See id.
102
The tobacco companies’ suit was brought over ten months before the FDA proposed
any specific graphic images, and over seventeen months before the FDA published its
Final Rule identifying the final nine graphic images. See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553.
Accordingly, the tobacco companies’ suit challenged provisions of the Smoking Act, not
the Final Rule. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521.
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Amendment. 103 Specifically, the tobacco companies challenged
the Smoking Act’s requirement that tobacco manufacturers reserve
a significant portion of cigarette packaging for the display of health
warnings, including graphic images, intended to illustrate the
dangers of smoking. 104
Following the district court’s summary judgment ruling in
favor of the government, 105 the tobacco companies appealed to the
Sixth Circuit. 106 Upon review, the circuit held that the district
court erred in applying “intermediate scrutiny.” 107 Nevertheless,
the circuit employed “rational-basis” review to affirm the district
court’s ruling. 108 The circuit’s dissent found the graphic warning
labels, excluding the size and position requirements,
unconstitutional under a merged “intermediate scrutiny” and
“rational-basis” standard. 109 However, the circuit held that
“rational-basis” review, alone, applied because the Smoking Act:
(1) compels commercial speech disclosures of factual information,
as opposed to compelled commercial speech disclosures of
personal or political opinion; 110 and (2) seeks to remedy the
tobacco companies’ “potentially misleading” commercial
speech. 111

103

Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 521.
Id. at 528–32; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 520.
105
Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
106
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518.
107
Compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558, with Commonwealth Brands, 678 F.
Supp. 2d at 520–21.
108
Compare Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558, with Commonwealth Brands, 678 F.
Supp. 2d at 512. The circuit’s holding was not unanimous, but was split between Judge
Stranch, Judge Barrett, and Judge Clay. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518, 551–52.
109
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 522–31 (Clay, J., dissenting), 568 (dissent merging
“intermediate scrutiny” and “rational-basis” reviews to hold the graphic warning labels,
minus the size and position requirements, unconstitutional).
110
Id. at 555–59 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
1324, 1340–41 (2010); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650
(1985); National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001)) (other
internal citations omitted).
111
Id. at 558 (quoting Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding that “Zauderer applies not only when the required disclosure ‘targets
speech that is inherently misleading,’ but also ‘where, as here, the speech is potentially
misleading.’”)).
104
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In employing “rational-basis” review, the circuit held it
undisputed that the textual warnings constitute factual disclosures
uncovered through scientific study. 112 Additionally, the circuit
held that graphic images depicting factual information can 113
constitute factual disclosures 114 even if they are intended to
“‘evoke a visceral response that subsumes rationale decisionmaking.’” 115 Furthermore, the circuit held that the tobacco
companies “knowingly and actively conspired to deceive the
public about the health risks and addictiveness of smoking for

112

Id. at 568 n.16 (citing the World Health Organization, Report on the Global Tobacco
Epidemic 44 (2011)).
113
Because the tobacco companies’ suit was brought over ten months before the FDA
proposed any specific graphic images, and over seventeen months before the FDA
published its Final Rule identifying the final nine graphic images, the tobacco companies
could not argue that any specific graphic image violated the First Amendment. See Disc.
Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553. Rather, the circuit court held that “[w]ithout any specific
graphic images to challenge, Plaintiffs’ argument is and must necessarily be that the
graphic-warning requirement on its face violates the First Amendment.” Id. Accordingly,
the circuit ruled that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to the warning
requirements, our concern is not the specific images the FDA chose . . . but
rather whether Plaintiffs can show that ‘no set of circumstances exists under which [the
statute] would be valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” United
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “To satisfy this burden, Plaintiffs would have to establish that a graphic
warning [can never] convey the negative health consequences of smoking accurately, a
position tantamount to concluding that pictures can never be factually accurate, only
written statements can be.” Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559.
114
The circuit court stated that a non-exhaustive list of graphic images that constitute
factual disclosures include “a picture or drawing of a nonsmoker’s and smoker’s lungs
displayed side by side; a picture of a doctor looking at an x-ray of either a smoker’s
cancerous lungs or some other part of the body presenting a smoking-related condition; a
picture or drawing of the internal anatomy of a person suffering from a smoking-related
medical condition; a picture or drawing of a person suffering from a smoking-related
medical condition; and any number of pictures consisting of text and simple graphic
images.” Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559. Furthermore, the circuit held that “[t]here is
nothing in the graphics-warning provision that forbids the graphics from merely being
words. For example, a graphic could consist of one of the required textual warnings—
‘WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children.’—written in what appears to be a
child’s handwriting. Such a graphic would clearly be a factual and accurate disclosure
that therefore would be scrutinized for a rational basis.” Id.
115
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 560 n.9 (quoting dissent at 529).
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decades,” 116 and, thus, current cigarette warning labels are
“potentially misleading.” 117
Finally, the circuit held that there is a “rational connection”
between the required textual and graphic warnings’ purpose and
the means used to achieve that purpose. 118 The circuit ruled that
current cigarette warning labels are outdated and fail to effectively
convey the risks of smoking. 119 Additionally, the circuit held that
the Smoking Act’s textual and graphic warnings are better able to
promote public understanding of the full dangers of tobacco use. 120
Moreover, the circuit held that the size and position of these
warnings, which cover the top fifty percent of the front and back
panels of all cigarette packages, are not unduly burdensome
because they help further such understanding. 121 Accordingly, the
circuit ruled that the graphic images are “reasonably related” to the
warnings’ purpose of preventing consumers from being misled
about the health risks of using tobacco, and, thus, are
constitutional. 122
B. The D.C. Circuit Employs Central Hudson’s “Intermediate
Scrutiny” Standard to Hold the Final Rule’s Graphic Cigarette
Warning Labels Unconstitutional
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. United States Food and
Drug Administration, five tobacco companies 123 brought action in

116

Id. at 562 (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1105–08,
1119–20, 1122–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“affirming the district court’s finding
of deception for nine tobacco manufacturers—two of whom are plaintiffs in [Disc.
Tobacco]”)).
117
Id. at 562–63.
118
Id. at 561–62 (citing National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
119
Id. at 563 (collecting scientific evidence).
120
Id. at 564–66 (collecting scientific evidence).
121
Smoking Act § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 &
Supp. 2009)); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561, 561 n.10.
122
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–62, 565.
123
The five tobacco companies included R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Lorillard
Tobacco Company, Commonwealth Brands, Inc., Liggett Group LLC, and Santa Fe
Natural Tobacco Company. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and
Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
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the D.C. District against the FDA and other officials. 124 The suit
challenged the agency’s Final Rule 125 requiring tobacco companies
to reserve a significant portion of cigarette packaging for the
display of graphic health warnings. 126 Specifically, the tobacco
companies alleged that the Final Rule’s graphic warnings
unconstitutionally compel speech, 127 and, thus, violate the First
Amendment. 128
Following the district court’s preliminary injunction 129 and
subsequent summary judgment 130 orders in favor of the tobacco
companies, the FDA appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 131 Upon review,
the D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in applying strict

124

Id. The tobacco companies also brought action against Margaret Hamburg
(Commissioner of the FDA) and Kathleen Sebelius (Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services). See id.
125
This case is distinguishable from Commonwealth Brands and Disc. Tobacco in that
it challenged the FDA’s Final Rule. Compare id. at 43–44, with Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d
at 521, and Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519
(W.D. Ky. 2010). See also discussion, supra note 102. As opposed to Reynolds, both
Commonwealth Brands and Disc. Tobacco were briefed and decided after the Smoking
Act was passed, but before the FDA’s Final Rule was promulgated. See Reynolds, 823 F.
Supp. 2d at 44 n.17 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 24 n.3; Defendants’ Opposition ¶ 14
n.7); see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553; discussion, supra note 102. Thus, the
plaintiffs in Disc. Tobacco and Commonwealth Brands were incapable of challenging any
of the nine graphic images the FDA ultimately selected. See Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at
44 n.17; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553; discussion, supra note 113. Those
plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in this case, were only able to mount a facial challenge to
the constitutionality of graphic warnings in general. See Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 44
n.17; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 553; discussion, supra note 113. Accordingly,
because this case turned on facts that were not available in Commonwealth Brands and
Disc. Tobacco, it is distinguishable in that “it presents new questions of law and fact—
and new applications of law to facts.” Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 44 n.17.
126
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 43–44 (citing Trial Record at 9:1-3; 10:20-23).
127
Id. at 44 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
128
Id. at 44 (citing Trial Record at 10:20-23).
129
Id. at 39.
130
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (W.D. Ky.
2010).
131
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
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scrutiny. 132 Nevertheless, the circuit employed “intermediate
scrutiny” to affirm the district court’s ruling. 133
The circuit’s dissent found the graphic warning labels,
excluding the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number,
constitutional under “rational-basis” review. 134 However, the
circuit held that “intermediate scrutiny” review applied 135 because
the circuit held that the FDA’s Final Rule: (1) compels commercial
speech disclosures of personal opinion, as opposed to commercial
speech disclosures of factual information; 136 and (2) does not seek
to remedy any “potentially misleading” commercial speech. 137
The circuit held that the Final Rule’s graphic images do not depict
factual information because they are misleading and subject to
misinterpretation. 138 Additionally, the circuit held that even if
cigarette warning labels are considered “potentially misleading”
speech, “none of the proposed warnings [remedied such speech
because they do not] purport to address the [consumer] information
gaps identified by the government.” 139
In employing “intermediate scrutiny” review, the circuit agreed
with the district court that “the Government’s actual purpose [in
requiring the graphic warning labels] is not to inform or educate,
but rather to advocate a change in behavior—specifically to
encourage smoking cessation and to discourage potential new

132

Compare id. at 1217, with Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221–1222. The circuit’s holding was not unanimous, but
was split between Judge Randolph and Judge Brown, and Judge Rogers. Id. at 1208,
1222.
134
Id. at 1222–23, 1237–38 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissent applying “rational-basis”
review to hold the graphic warning labels constitutional); id. at 1234, 1236–38 (Rogers,
J., dissenting) (dissent applying “intermediate scrutiny” to hold the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” telephone number unconstitutional); see also id. at 1237–38 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (dissent holding the graphic warning labels also withstand “intermediate
scrutiny”).
135
Id. at 1217.
136
Id. at 1216–17.
137
Id. at 1213–16.
138
Id. at 1216–17.
139
Id. at 1215 n.8.
133
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smokers from starting.” 140 However, unlike the district court, the
circuit was uncertain whether the government’s interest in
advocating for smoking cessation could constitute a “substantial
interest.” 141 Accordingly, the circuit proceeded with its analysis
under the assumption that promoting smoking cessation is a
“substantial interest.” 142
Even assuming that the government has a “substantial interest”
in altering smoking behavior, the circuit held that the FDA
provided no evidence that the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels
will “‘directly advance[ ] the governmental interest’” in reducing
the number of Americans who smoke, “to a ‘material degree.’” 143
Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that the Final Rule’s graphic warning
labels are unconstitutional. 144
III. ARGUMENT: THE FINAL RULE’S GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. “Rational-Basis” and “Intermediate Scrutiny” Hybrid is the
Applicable Standard of Review
1. “Strict Scrutiny” Review Does Not Apply
In contesting the constitutionality of the Final Rule’s graphic
warning labels, the tobacco companies contend that the labels
“‘attempt[] to regulate ‘what shall be orthodox in . . . matters of
opinion’—i.e., whether individuals should buy and use a lawful
product—[and, thus,] must be subject to strict scrutiny.’” 145
140

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218; Reynolds, 823 F.
Supp. 2d at 47–48.
141
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 n.13.
142
Id. at 1218.
143
Id. at 1218 (alteration in original) (quoting Fl. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618, 626 (1995); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566); see also Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219–
21.
144
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222.
145
Id. at 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Appellees’ Brief at 31 (quoting
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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However, the Supreme Court has held that “our decisions have
recognized ‘the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties
of speech.’” 146 The Constitution therefore affords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression,” 147 such as religious or political speech, 148
except under limited circumstances not here present. 149
Furthermore, the Court held that this distinction—affording lesser
constitutional
protection
to
commercial
speech
than
noncommercial speech—applies to both speech restrictions and
compelled disclosures. 150
146

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63
(1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–456 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
147
Id.; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
148
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quotation omitted) (“Ohio has not attempted to
‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.’”).
149
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (applying “strict
scrutiny” to a commercial speech regulation imposing “a burden based on the content of
speech and the identity of the speaker”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2733 (2011) (citation omitted) (applying “strict scrutiny” to a commercial speech
regulation affixing the number “18” to video games deemed “violent,” holding that
“video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar
literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music),” and “‘esthetic and moral
judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority’”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“[W]hen a
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is
far less reason to depart from the rigorous [‘strict scrutiny’] review that the First
Amendment generally demands.”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475
U.S. 1, 9, 10 (1986) (internal citations omitted) (applying “strict scrutiny” to a regulation
that “discriminates on the basis of the viewpoints of the selected speakers,” and “extends
well beyond speech that proposes a business transaction and includes the kind of
discussion of matters of public concern that the First Amendment both fully protects and
implicitly encourages”).
150
See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (“When a State regulates commercial messages
to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation
is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.”). Despite the Court’s ruling, the
Four Decisions are divided on whether “strict scrutiny,” absent an exception specified,
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supra, note 149, applies to commercial speech disclosures. See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at
1212 n.5, 1217; id. at 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554
(citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651–52 (7th Cir.
2006); id. at 527 (Clay, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274; Commonwealth
Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 520, 531. Specifically, the argument posed is that the lesser
protection espoused in the Court’s distinction—affording lesser constitutional protection
to commercial speech than noncommercial speech—refers to “intermediate scrutiny,”
which it is argued only applies to the commercial speech restrictions Central
Hudson addressed. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557, 562–63; B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr.,
Note, Joe Camel Versus Uncle Sam: The Constitutionality of Graphic Cigarette Warning
Labels, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2811, 2848. Thus, according to this view, commercial
speech disclosures must be examined under “strict scrutiny,” unless Zauderer carves out
an exception for utilizing “rational-basis” review. See Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2846–
2849. However, aside from ignoring Liquormart’s ruling, this argument must fail on its
own face. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 and accompanying parenthetical
explanation, supra note 149. It is true that the Court has never applied “intermediate
scrutiny” to compelled disclosures. See Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2848. However, the
Court never specified Central Hudson’s contours, nor affirmatively limited its scope to
commercial speech restrictions. See id. Additionally, the Zauderer Court reiterated the
commercial versus non-commercial distinction in two separate instances when applying
“rational-basis” review to commercial speech disclosures. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S.
at 637 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557) (“There is no longer any room to doubt that
what has come to be known as ‘commercial speech’ is entitled to the protection of the
First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded
‘noncommercial speech.’”) (other citations omitted), with id. at 638 (citing Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 566) (“Our general approach to restrictions on commercial speech is also by
now well settled . . . . Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not
concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only in the service of a
substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that
interest.”); see also Fl. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). Accordingly,
it cannot be said that the distinction’s first articulation in Zauderer, though
referencing Central Hudson, only referred to commercial speech restrictions for such
would render the second articulation, which clearly referred to commercial speech
restrictions, superfluous. Rather, in repeating this distinction, the Court must have
intended for the first articulation to refer to a general rule that all commercial speech,
including disclosures, is subject to lesser constitutional protection than non-commercial
speech, and then utilized the second articulation to apply this general rule specifically to
commercial speech restrictions. It is further true that the Milavetz Court held that
“‘[b]ecause the challenged provisions impose a disclosure requirement rather than an
affirmative limitation on speech, . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer [and
not Central Hudson] governs our review.’” Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2848
(quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339
(2010)). However, the Supreme Court has held that “the difference [between compelled
speech and compelled silence] is without constitutional significance,” except that “in the
context of commercial speech, compulsion to speak may be less violative of the First
Amendment than prohibitions on speech and thus trigger a lower level of scrutiny.” Riley
v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); Reynolds, 696 F.3d at
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None of the Four Decisions’ majority opinions, nor any of their
dissenting opinions, deny that “[t]he speech at issue—proposing
the sale of cigarettes—is indisputably commercial speech.” 151 In
fact, “[t]he tobacco companies [themselves] advance no argument
that their cigarette packaging and advertisements propose anything
other than a commercial transaction.” 152 Accordingly, as the D.C.
Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds stated, “because matters of opinion
over whether individuals should buy and use a lawful product fall
squarely within the domain of commercial advertising recognized
by the Supreme Court, [the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels]
thereof [are] not, as the [Reynolds] district court ruled, subject to
strict scrutiny.” 153 Thus, “the question is whether, under the
traditional standards adopted by the Supreme Court, the
government’s [graphic] warning label requirement is subject to the

1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51) (alteration in
original). Therefore, Zauderer must be viewed as a permissive exception to Central
Hudson, not a restriction, whereas Central Hudson must be viewed as a restriction
on Zauderer—though one’s First Amendment rights are not adequately protected in
applying the most lenient “rational-basis” standard to the more violative commercial
speech restrictions, applying the more stringent “intermediate scrutiny” standard to the
less violative commercial speech disclosures further safeguards those rights (not to
mention the government’s interests as the alternative argument requires “strict scrutiny”
when Zauderer is inapplicable). See Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2849–2852 (applying
“strict scrutiny” to commercial disclosures when Zauderer is inapplicable).
Thus, Milavetz did not hold nor imply that “intermediate scrutiny” cannot apply to
commercial speech disclosures where “rational-basis” review is inapplicable (such as
where the regulation does not address potentially misleading speech); rather, the Court
held that where a regulation does not concern a commercial speech restriction, but a
disclosure that falls under Zauderer’s ambit, “rational-basis” review takes precedence
over “intermediate scrutiny.” Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339. Nevertheless, even
assuming, arguendo, that “strict scrutiny” applies in “intermediate scrutiny’s” place, the
Final Rule’s graphic warning labels do not even withstand the much lower “intermediate
scrutiny” and “rational-basis” standards of review. See infra Part III.B. Accordingly, this
Note will proceed with its analysis under the lower burdens of Central
Hudson and Zauderer. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
151
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217, 1222, 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 845
F. Supp. 2d at 272–74; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518, 522, 551–52 (Clay, J.,
dissenting); Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21.
152
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
153
Id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562; United States
v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). But see discussion,
supra note 150.
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‘less exacting scrutiny’ of Zauderer [], or to intermediate scrutiny
under Central Hudson.” 154
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Reynolds district court and
the comparable Seventh Circuit Blagojevich court were correct in
applying “strict scrutiny” to the present issue, 155 the Final Rule’s
graphic warning labels do not even withstand the much lower
“intermediate scrutiny” and “rational-basis” standards of review. 156
Accordingly, this Note will proceed with its analysis under the
lower burdens of Central Hudson and Zauderer. 157
2. “Rational-Basis” Review Only Applies to Four of the Final
Rule’s Graphic Images
At first glance, it appears that “rational-basis” review applies to
all nine of the Final Rule’s graphic images and textual warnings,
and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number. For instance,
the Supreme Court held that “because the challenged provisions
impose a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative
limitation on speech, . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in
Zauderer governs our review.” 158 According to the Supreme
154

Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222 (internal citations omitted) (Rogers, J., dissenting). But
see discussion, supra note 150.
155
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006); Reynolds,
823 F. Supp. 2d at 46; Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274. Blagojevich is comparable to
the present issue in that it addressed mandated warning labels affixing the number “18” to
video games deemed “sexually explicit.” Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 641.
However, Blagojevich can be distinguished from the present issue as it “involved labels
that were necessarily subjective and exclusively nonfactual.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231
n.9 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652 (“The sticker
ultimately communicates a subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s
content is sexually explicit.”). Unlike the Final Rule’s warning labels, the very definition
of “sexually explicit” is necessarily opinion based, and, thus, Blagojevich’s “labels [are]
nonfactual because there [are] no facts to convey.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 n.9
(Rogers, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 192–95. Additionally, unlike the
present issue, “strict scrutiny” may be applied in Blagojevich under the rationale
espoused in Brown. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 and accompanying parenthetical
explanation, supra note 149.
156
See infra Part III.B.
157
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
158
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).
The Court’s ruling, however, does not foreclose the application of “intermediate
scrutiny” to compelled disclosures. See supra note 150.
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Court, this is because “disclosure requirements trench much more
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on
speech.” 159
It is true that an argument can be made that the size of the
warnings—which cover the top fifty percent of the front and back
panels of all cigarette packages 160—inhibits the tobacco
companies’ ability to add more information or advertisements to
the cigarette packages, and, thus, affirmatively limit their speech.
However, the tobacco companies have not provided “any evidence
that similar restrictions elsewhere have hindered the tobacco
companies ability to get their own message to consumers,” 161 nor
that the tobacco companies would have utilized the confiscated
portions to provide additional information or advertisements. 162
Accordingly, it seems clear that the Final Rule’s graphic warning
labels do not affirmatively limit free speech, and, thus, should be
subject to “rational-basis” review.
However, though the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels
appear to only impose disclosure requirements, such, alone, does
not meet the Supreme Court’s threshold for applying “rationalbasis” review. 163 In addition to not affirmatively limiting speech,
159

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
See Final Rule, 76 Fed Reg. 36,628, 36,674 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §
1141 (2011)).
161
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1233 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
162
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1205; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 509; Reynolds, 845 F.
Supp. 2d at 266; Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512. Perhaps an argument
can also be made that the Final Rule’s warning labels—which cover the top fifty percent
of the front and back panels of all cigarette packages—prevent the tobacco companies
from advertising or providing information on the portion of cigarette packages most
likely to be seen and read by consumers, and, thus, affirmatively limit and hinder their
ability to disseminate information (at least in regard to some consumers who will not read
the bottom portions or side panels of cigarette packages). See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36,674. However, as stated above, the tobacco companies have not provided “any
evidence that similar restrictions elsewhere have hindered the tobacco companies’ ability
to get their own message to consumers.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1233 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, because it appears that the Final Rule’s graphic warning labels
do not even withstand the less-exacting “rational-basis” standard of review, this Note will
proceed with its analysis under the assumption that the warning labels do not
affirmatively limit the tobacco companies’ free speech. See infra Part III.B.
163
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
160
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the Supreme Court has held that, for Zauderer to apply, the
regulation must impose compelled disclosers of “purely factual and
uncontroversial information.” 164 This requirement is buttressed by
the policy consideration behind applying lower scrutiny to
commercial speech disclosures. 165 As the Supreme Court stated,
“[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to
consumers of the information such speech provides, appellants’
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal.” 166
Furthermore, before “rational-basis” review may be applied,
the commercial speech disclosure must involve “potentially
misleading” speech. 167 As the Supreme Court held, Zauderer
applies to regulations “directed at misleading commercial speech,”
but “[i]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity, the government’s power is more
circumscribed[—][t]he State must assert a substantial interest . . .
[and] the restriction must directly advance the state interest
involved.” 168 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
speech need not actually be misleading for “rational-basis” review
to apply. 169 According to the Court, the government need only
show that the targeted commercial speech presents the “possibility
of deception” or a “tendency to mislead.” 170 In fact, if the speech
is actually misleading, the Supreme Court has held that it enjoys no
First Amendment protection. 171
164

Id.
See id.
166
Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976)).
167
See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
168
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; see also 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508 (1996) (applying Central Hudson to nonmisleading commercial speech); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768–69 (1993)
(applying Central Hudson to non-misleading commercial speech).
169
See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
170
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1227 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
171
See id. (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
165
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This requirement that the speech be “potentially misleading”
for Zauderer to apply also accords with the policy consideration
behind applying lower scrutiny to commercial speech
disclosures. 172 As the Supreme Court held, “‘warning[s] or
disclaimer[s] [enjoy lower constitutional protection] . . . in order to
dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion and deception.’” 173
Among the Four Decisions, there seems to be unanimity that
the labels must consist of factual information and address
“potentially misleading” speech for “rational-basis” review to
apply. 174 However, the Four Decisions disagree on whether the
warning labels must consist of purely factual and uncontroversial
information. 175 Additionally, there is disagreement across these
decisions regarding whether the warning labels must seek to, and
actually, remedy “potentially misleading” speech. 176 Accordingly,
in an abundance of caution, this Note will proceed with its analysis
under the assumption that the warning labels need not contain
purely factual and uncontroversial information, and need not seek
to, nor actually, remedy “potentially misleading” speech for
Zauderer review to apply.
Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that the Final Rule’s
graphic warning labels need not provide purely factual and
172

See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201
(1982) (citations omitted)).
174
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213–17, 1227–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F.Supp.2d 266, 272–274 (D.D.C. 2012);
Disc. Tobacco & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 522–31, 555–59 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Clay, J., dissenting); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. U.S., 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 512
(W.D. Ky. 2010).
175
Compare Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1215 (holding information must be purely factual
and uncontroversial for Zauderer to apply), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., 823 F.Supp. 2d 36, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding information must be
purely factual and uncontroversial for Zauderer to apply), with Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d
at 558–559 n.8 (holding information need not be purely factual and uncontroversial for
Zauderer to apply).
176
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1215–16 n.8 (holding information must seek to, and
actually, remedy “potentially misleading” speech for Zauderer to apply); Disc. Tobacco,
674 F.3d at 558 (holding information need not seek to, nor actually, remedy “potentially
misleading” speech for Zauderer to apply) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
173
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uncontroversial information, and need not seek to, nor actually,
remedy “potentially misleading” speech, “rational-basis” review
only applies to the Final Rule’s nine textual warnings and four of
its graphic images. None of the Four Decisions, nor the tobacco
companies themselves, assert that the nine textual warnings
contain non-factual information. 177 Additionally, it seems that
cigarette packages do constitute “potentially misleading”
speech. 178 However, only four of the Final Rule’s nine graphic
images depict factual information. 179 Accordingly, because five of
the Final Rule’s graphic images and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW”
telephone number fail to convey any factual information, 180 these
five images and the quit-line number must be reviewed under
“intermediate scrutiny.” 181
a) Only Four of the Final Rule’s Graphic Images Depict
Factual Information
The FDA concedes that the Final Rule’s nine graphic images
evoke an emotional response intended to shock the viewer to retain
the information in the textual warnings. 182 However, the fact that
“‘the graphic warning labels are intended to create a visceral
reaction in the consumer, in order to make a consumer less
emotionally likely to use or purchase a tobacco product;’ and that
‘colorful graphic images can evoke a visceral response that
subsumes rationale [sic] decision-making,’” does not render these
images non-factual. 183

177

See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217–23, 1229–30 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 845
F. Supp. 2d 266; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509; Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d
512.
178
See infra Part III.A.2.b.
179
See infra Part III.A.2.a.
180
See id.
181
But see discussion, supra note 150.
182
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (citing Appellants’ Brief at 33 (“citing research
showing that ‘pictures are easier to remember than words’”), 38 (“citing FDA’s finding
that a substantial body of scientific literature shows that emotional responses, such as
worry and disgust, ‘reliably predict the likelihood that consumers will understand and
appreciate the substance of the warnings’”)).
183
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 560 n.9 (quoting dissent at 529).
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As the D.C. Circuit in Reynolds held, “factually accurate,
emotive, and persuasive are not mutually exclusive descriptions;
the emotive quality of the selected images does not necessarily
undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.” 184 Furthermore, the
use of graphic images, even if digitally enhanced or illustrated,
does not necessarily render the warnings nonfactual. 185 For
instance, the Supreme Court held that “‘[t]he use of illustrations or
pictures in advertisements serves important communicative
functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s
message, and it may also serve to impart information directly.’” 186
Accordingly, it seems clear that four of the Final Rule’s
graphic images depict factual information regarding the negative
health consequences of smoking. The images of: (1) “a pair of
diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy lungs;” (2) “a diseased
mouth afflicted with what appears to be cancerous lesions;” (3) “a
man breathing into an oxygen mask;” and (4) “a stylized cartoon
(as opposed to a staged photograph) of a premature baby in an
incubator” 187 “are, in fact, accurate depictions of the negative
effects of sickness and disease caused by smoking,” 188 and “the
tobacco companies do not suggest otherwise.” 189 “That such
images are not [] comforting to look at does not necessarily make
them inaccurate.” 190 The fact is, “‘the severe, life-threatening and
sometimes disfiguring health effects of smoking conveyed in the

184

Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
See id.
186
Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1990); 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14 (2011) (“requiring skull-and-crossbones warnings
on poisonous products”)).
187
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F.Supp.2d 36, 41–42
(D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also supra Part I.A.3
(displaying the nine graphic images).
188
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed.
Reg. 36,628, 36,696 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,527–29 (Nov.
12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (collecting scientific evidence).
189
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
190
Id.
185
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required warnings are disturbing and the images [] . . . selected
appropriately reflect this fact.”’ 191
Though the Seventh Circuit in Blagojevich held that a foursquare-inch sticker with the number “18” (representing a restricted
age requirement) amounted to non-factual information, 192
Blagojevich is distinguishable from the present issue. As the Sixth
Circuit stated in Discount Tobacco, “what constitutes a sexually
explicit video game is a matter of personal taste and sexual morals
that is necessarily based on opinion, as enshrined in the very
definition of ‘sexually explicit’ that Blagojevich examined.” 193 “In
other words, a game could be deemed sexually explicit solely on
the basis of widely divergent local standards.” 194 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit concluded, “[a] required disclosure announcing that the
game is sexually explicit communicates the government’s opinion
that the game is sexually explicit.” 195 In contrast, “[t]he health
risks of smoking tobacco have been uncovered through scientific
study. They are facts. Warnings about these risks—whether
textual or graphic—can communicate these facts.” 196
However, five of the Final Rule’s graphic images “fail[] to
convey any factual information supported by evidence about the
actual health consequences of smoking.” 197 In fact, the FDA
admits that the images of: (1) “a man exhaling cigarette smoke
through a tracheotomy hole in his throat;” (2) “a plume of cigarette
smoke enveloping an infant receiving a kiss from his or her
mother;” (3) “a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and
featuring what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the
middle of his torso;” (4) “a woman weeping uncontrollably;” and
(5) “a man wearing a t-shirt that features a ‘no smoking’ symbol

191

Id. (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,696) (emphasis omitted).
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2006).
193
Disc. Tobacco & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 561 (6th Cir. 2012)
(referencing Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 648–50).
194
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
R.J, Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273
(D.D.C. 2012).
192
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and the words ‘I Quit,’” 198 are not meant to be interpreted literally,
but rather symbolize their accompanying textual warning
statements—“which provide ‘additional context for what is
shown.’” 199
Furthermore, in addition to not depicting any factual
information regarding the negative health consequences of
smoking, two of these images actually depict misleading
information. Specifically, the image of “a man exhaling cigarette
smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his throat” 200 suggests that
such a procedure is a common consequence of smoking. 201
However, the FDA concedes that such information is inaccurate. 202
Instead, the FDA claims the image is used to symbolize “‘the
addictive nature of smoking,’” a fact the image does not accurately
depict. 203 Additionally, the image of “a bare-chested male cadaver
lying on a table, and featuring what appears to be post-autopsy
chest staples down the middle of his torso,” 204 suggests that
smoking leads to autopsies. 205 However, the FDA provides no
evidence that autopsies are a common consequence of smoking. 206
Instead, the FDA contends that “the image symbolizes that
‘smoking kills 443,000 Americans each year,’” 207 a fact that image
does not accurately depict.
It is true that the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds held that
“[a]ll of these objections pertain to the images divorced from their
accompanying text and thus fail to address the relevant question—
198

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41–
42 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also supra Part I.A.3
(displaying the nine graphic images).
199
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,655 (June
22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)).
200
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 57, 59); see also
supra Part I.A.3 (displaying the nine graphic images).
201
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.
202
See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (citing Defendants’ Opposition at 43).
203
Id. (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 43).
204
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42 (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶¶ 57, 59); see
also supra Part I.A.3 (displaying the nine graphic images).
205
See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
206
See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (citing Defendants’ Opposition at 42).
207
Id. (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 42).
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whether the images render the overall message conveyed by the
warning labels nonfactual. Viewed with the text they accompany,
none of these images has that effect.” 208 For instance, the
Reynolds dissent held that:
The image accompanying the textual warning
“Cigarettes are addictive” depicts a man smoking
through a tracheotomy opening in his throat.
Viewed with the accompanying text, this image
conveys the tenacity of nicotine addiction: even
after undergoing surgery for cancer, one might be
unable to abstain from smoking . . . . This image
thus serves to underline the factual, and now
uncontroversial, statement that cigarettes are highly
addictive. Similarly, the image of a man with
staples in his chest lying on an autopsy table works
with, not against, the textual warning “Smoking can
kill you.” . . . [Additionally,] [t]he images of a baby
enveloped in smoke and a woman crying both
depict the significant harms of secondhand smoke.
These images accompany the textual warnings
“Tobacco smoke can harm your children” and
“Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in
nonsmokers,”
respectively . . . .
Addressing
potential purchasers of cigarettes, these two
warning labels convey the message that smoking
poses risks not only to them, but also to their family
members and others . . . . [Furthermore,] the image
of a man wearing a t-shirt that reads “I QUIT” . . .
in connection with the textual warning “Quitting
smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your
health,” [] conveys the message “I quit, and I am
alive and healthy.” 209

208

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
209
Id. at 1231–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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However, the Reynolds dissent failed to provide any legal
support for its assertion that the whole is greater than its parts. 210
Furthermore, such a notion fails to properly weigh the tobacco
companies’ First Amendment right, to refrain from speaking,
against the public’s right to be informed. 211 Each compelled
speech disclosure—that is, every compelled statement and every
compelled graphic image—potentially violates the tobacco
companies’ freedom of speech anew, 212 and, thus, the
constitutionality of each disclosure must be assessed individually.
Accordingly, in determining whether Zauderer review applies, a
court cannot merely look to whether a compelled disclosure in
conjunction with another compelled disclosure constitutes a factual
disclosure as a whole; rather, courts must assess the factual nature
of each individual compelled speech disclosure.
Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that the Reynolds
dissent was correct in asserting that the graphic images need only
be factually accurate as a whole (in conjunction with its
corresponding textual warning) and thus Zauderer review applies
to all nine graphic images, such would not alter the
constitutionality of the five graphic images in question. 213 As this
Note will demonstrate below, all nine graphic images fail to pass
constitutional muster even under Zauderer’s “rational-basis”
review. 214
Finally, the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number,
displayed in conjunction with the Final Rule’s nine textual and
graphic warnings, also fails to depict any factual information
regarding the health consequences of smoking; rather, the quit-line
number merely provides a medium through which factual
210

See id.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996) (weighing the
possibility that “‘a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying
governmental policy’”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(the right to refrain from speaking is protected under the First Amendment).
212
See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (the right to refrain from speaking is protected under
the First Amendment).
213
See infra Part III.B.
214
See id.
211
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information can be obtained. Specifically, the FDA imposed this
requirement in order “to provide a place where smokers and other
members of the public can obtain smoking cessation information
from staff trained specifically to help smokers quit by delivering
unbiased and evidence-based information, advice, and support.” 215
b) Cigarette Packages Are “Potentially Misleading”
It appears that cigarette packages do constitute “potentially
misleading” information. It is true that there are no “congressional
findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself.” 216
However, the Supreme Court has held that where “‘the likelihood
of deception’ is ‘hardly a speculative one,’ the Government need
not produce ‘evidence that [the] advertisements are
misleading.’” 217 Furthermore, the FDA claims that consumers are
uninformed about “the nature and extent of the health risks
associated with smoking cigarettes,” 218 such as “the severity and
magnitude” of those risks, their personal risks, the effects of
secondhand smoke, and the highly addictive nature of cigarettes. 219
Accordingly, in light of the tobacco companies’ history of
deceiving consumers about the negative health effects of
smoking, 220 it seems clear that cigarette packages remain likely to
mislead consumers notwithstanding the existing warnings.
As the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds noted:
[I]t is [] beyond dispute that the tobacco companies
have engaged in a decades-long campaign to
deceive consumers about [the negative health
effects of smoking] []. [For instance,] [d]espite
215

Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,540 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)).
216
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
217
Id. at 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
218
Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,632 (June 22, 2011) (codified in 21 C.F.R. §
1141 (2011))
219
Id. at 36,632–33.
220
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1224 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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knowledge of “the negative health consequences of
smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of
nicotine, [and] the harmfulness of secondhand
smoke,” tobacco company executives “made,
caused to be made, and approved public statements
contrary to this knowledge.” Specifically, they
“publicly denied and distorted the truth about the
addictive nature of their products, suppressed
research revealing the addictiveness of nicotine, and
denied their efforts to control nicotine levels and
delivery,” all while “engineer[ing] their products
around creating and sustaining [nicotine]
addiction.”
The tobacco company executives
“knew of the[ ] falsity” of their statements “at the
time” and “made the statements with the intent to
deceive.” . . . [Additionally,] Congress found that in
2005 the tobacco companies “spent more than $13
[billion] to attract new users, retain current users,
increase current consumption, and generate
favorable long-term attitudes toward smoking and
tobacco use,” “often misleadingly portray[ing] the
use of tobacco as socially acceptable and healthful
to minors.” 221
Moreover, in addition to the tobacco companies’ decades-long
deception, it seems that cigarette packages, in their own right,
actually deceive consumers if they do not properly warn
consumers about tobacco’s serious health risks. 222 The Supreme
Court has expressly acknowledged this fact when it approvingly
referenced the Federal Trade Commission’s conclusion that “[t]o
avoid giving a false impression that smoking [is] innocuous, the
cigarette manufacturer who represents the alleged pleasures or
satisfactions of cigarette smoking in his advertising must also
221

Id. (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1107, 1121,
1124 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 2(16)–(17), 123 Stat. 1776,
1778 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))).
222
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 527 (1992); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
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disclose the serious risks to life that smoking involves.” 223 The
Court also held that these disclosures may “appear in such a form,
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers,
as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.” 224
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds noted that
a previous D.C. Circuit case is instructive on the current issue. 225
Specifically:
[In] Spirit Airlines, [the D.C. Circuit] addressed a
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) rule
requiring that the most prominent number displayed
in airfare advertisements be the total price, inclusive
of taxes. Notwithstanding the airlines’ compliance
with
preexisting
regulations
requiring
advertisements to display the entire ticket cost as
well as the amount of any tax, the court accepted
[the] DOT’s determination, based on common sense
and experience, “that it was deceitful and
misleading when the most prominent price listed by
an airline is anything other than the total, final price
of air travel.” Accordingly, the court proceeded to
review the rule under Zauderer.
[Thus, the
Reynolds dissent held that] [e]ven absent any
affirmatively
misleading
statements, cigarette
packages and other advertisements that fail to
display the final costs of smoking in a prominent
manner are at least as misleading as the airline
advertisements in Spirit Airlines. 226
Despite this evidence, among the Four Decisions, the D.C.
Circuit alone holds that cigarette packages do not constitute

223

Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–63 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527 (quoting
Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8,356 (1964)))
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
224
Id. (quoting Va. State, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
226
Id. (quoting Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 413 (D.C.
Cir. 2012)) (citing Spirit Airlines, 687 F.3d at 408–09, 413–14).
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“potentially misleading” speech. 227 Nevertheless, even assuming,
arguendo, that the D.C. Circuit was correct that cigarette packages
do not constitute “potentially misleading” speech, such would not
alter the constitutionality of the four graphic images in question. 228
As this Note will demonstrate below, all nine graphic images and
the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number fail to pass
constitutional muster even under Zauderer’s “rational-basis”
review, much less “intermediate scrutiny” review. 229
B. The Final Rule’s Graphic Images and “1–800–QUIT–NOW”
Telephone Number Do Not Withstand “Intermediate Scrutiny”
or “Rational-Basis” Review
1. The FDA Cannot Demonstrate That the Graphic Images
Advance the Government’s Interest
None of the Four Decisions question the seemingly obvious
purpose behind the Final Rule’s nine textual warnings, nor their
ability to advance their intended outcome. 230 Accordingly, this
Note will proceed under the assumption that the nine textual
warnings are intended to, and actually do, educate consumers on
the negative health consequences of smoking. Additionally, it
seems clear that the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number’s
purpose is to effect smoking cessation, and that the quit-line
number actually advances that intended outcome. 231

227

See id. at 1213–16 (majority holding cigarette packages do not constitute
“potentially misleading” speech); see also Hardesty, supra note 150, at 2850. But see
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding cigarette
packages do constitute “potentially misleading speech”); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–
63 (majority holding cigarette packages do constitute “potentially misleading speech”);
id. at 523–24 (Clay, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding cigarette packages do
constitute “potentially misleading” speech); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (failing to
address the issue); Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (failing to address the
issue).
228
See infra Part III.B.
229
See id.
230
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1205; Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 509; Reynolds, 845 F.
Supp. 2d at 266; Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
231
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1234, 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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As the D.C. Circuit’s dissent in Reynolds stated, the quit-line
telephone number is “not designed directly to inform consumers of
the health consequences of smoking, but to assist smokers in their
cessation efforts.” 232 Furthermore, the dissent noted that “[t]he
FDA imposed this requirement, pursuant to separate statutory
authority, 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d), in order ‘to provide a place where
smokers and other members of the public can obtain smoking
cessation information from staff trained specifically to help
smokers quit by delivering unbiased and evidence-based
information, advice, and support.’” 233
Additionally, the dissent held that:
There [] is substantial evidence to support the
FDA’s determination that the display of the “1–
800–QUIT–NOW” number will directly advance
this interest [in reducing smoking rates]. The
biological and psychological effects of nicotine
“can make smoking cessation extremely difficult,”
“about 40 percent of smokers try to quit” each year,
but “95 percent of those who try to quit on their
own relapse.” In comparison to minimal or no
counseling interventions, quitlines have been found
to “significantly increase abstinence rates.”
International experience referenced in the
rulemaking, further supports the common sense
proposition that informing smokers of cessation
resources is likely to increase rates of successful
quit attempts. 234

232

Id. (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,681 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)).
233
Id. at 1234 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524,
69,540 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (citing Final Rule, 76
Fed. Reg. at 36,681).
234
Id. at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting President’s Cancer Panel, Promoting
Healthy Lifestyles 62 (2007); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,681, 36,687 (citing U.S.
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Public Health Serv., Treating Tobacco Use and
Dependence: 2008 Update 91 (May 2008)) (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,682)
(other internal citations omitted).
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However, regarding the Final Rule’s nine graphic images, it is
unclear whether the FDA articulated one or two complementary
interests—to effect smoking cessation and/or to educate consumers
on the negative health consequences of smoking. 235 Furthermore,
there is disagreement among the Four Decisions on whether either
interest constitutes a “substantial interest” under Central
Hudson. 236 Nevertheless, it appears that the nine graphic images
fail to advance the intended outcome of either interest, and, thus,
cannot withstand Central Hudson or Zauderer review. 237
a) The FDA’s Interest in Utilizing Graphic Images
A review of the Smoking Act and the administrative record
makes clear that the FDA’s primary interest in requiring the Final
Rule’s graphic warnings is to encourage current smokers to quit
and dissuade other consumers from ever buying cigarettes. 238 For
instance, one of the Smoking Act’s many stated purposes is
“promot[ing] cessation to reduce disease risk and the social costs
associated with tobacco-related diseases.” 239 Additionally, in its
Final Rule, the FDA explained that “this effective communication
can help both to discourage nonsmokers, including minor children,
from initiating cigarette use and to encourage current smokers to
consider cessation to greatly reduce the serious risks that smoking
poses to their health.” 240 Furthermore, in the preamble to its
Proposed Rule, the FDA also stated that it has a “substantial

235

See infra Part III.B.1.a.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980); infra Part III.B.1.a.
237
See infra Part III.B.1.b.
238
See Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3(9), 123 Stat. 1776, 1782 (2009) (codified
at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011)); Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,628, 36,633, 36,640 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011));
Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §
1141 (2011)).
239
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 (alteration in original) (quoting the Smoking Act § 3(9)
(codified at 21 U.S.C § 387 Note (2011))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240
Id. at 1225 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,633)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
236
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interest in reducing the number of Americans, particularly children
and adolescents, who use cigarettes and other tobacco products.” 241
Moreover, the Institute of Medicine Report, on which the FDA
relied for some of its evidence supporting its Final Rule, 242 states
unequivocally that “the primary objective of tobacco regulation is
not to promote informed choice but rather to discourage
consumption of tobacco products . . . as a means of reducing
tobacco-related death and disease.” 243 The report further states
that “[e]ven though tobacco products are legally available to
adults, the paramount public health aim is to reduce the number of
people who use and become addicted to these products, through a
focus on children and youths,” and recommend that the “warnings
must be designed to promote this objective.” 244 Finally, David
Hammond, one of the principal researchers on whom the FDA
relies, 245 recommended that “the graphic warnings should ‘elicit
negative emotional reactions’ to convince smokers to quit.” 246
It is true that, both in its Proposed Rule and Final Rule, the
FDA stated that its “primary goal” in selecting the nine graphic
images is to “effectively convey the negative health consequences
of smoking on cigarette packages.” 247 However, it seems that this
241

Id. at 1218 (quoting Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,525) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
242
See id. at 1218 n.12.
243
Id. (quoting INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ENDING THE
TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 (Richard J. Bonnie, Kathleen
Stratton, and Robert B. Wallace eds., 2007), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/
2007/Ending-the-Tobacco-Problem-A-Blueprint-for-the-Nation.aspx) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
244
Id. (quoting INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ENDING THE
TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION, supra note 243 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
245
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1220; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food
and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (D.D.C. 2011).
246
Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (quoting David Hammond, Health Warnings
Messages on Tobacco Products: A Review, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 327, 331–32
(2011), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/20/5/327.full.pdf).
247
Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,633 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §
1141 (2011)); see also Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Final
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,641) (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,630, 36,633–42,
36,646–47, 36,696–97, 36,699); Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,526, 69531–35
(Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (“the purpose of these
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purported interest merely describes the means by which the FDA is
attempting to fulfill its true interest in reducing smoking rates. As
the FDA stated, “[t]he goal of effectively communicating the risks
of cigarette smoking is, of course, related to the viewer’s decision
to quit, or never to start, smoking.” 248 In fact, the Reynolds district
court went so far as to suggest that “the Government appears to
have chosen this ‘informational’ goal as its official purpose
because it most closely mirrors the Zauderer exception and would
thus be subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny.” 249
Furthermore, the notion that the FDA’s true goal in requiring
the graphic images is to educate consumers does not seem to
comport with the evidence the FDA used to support its Final
Rule. 250 As the Reynolds district court held:
[T]he Government—through its own data and, in
fact, its own words—evinces a purpose wholly
separate from education.
In particular, the
Government spends much of its brief discussing the
18,000-consumer study that the FDA commissioned
to help determine which of the 36 proposed graphic
images it would ultimately select. In so doing, the
Government acknowledges that the study
was not designed to assess whether the proposed
graphic images would have a statistically significant
impact on consumer awareness of smoking risks,
but rather to “assess[ ] the relative impact of
different warnings based on participants’ exposure
to one graphic warning on one occasion.” Thus,
instead of focusing on its own alleged primary
goal—providing information to consumers—the
Government effectively admits that it looked only
to relative impact, thus side-stepping the basic

required warnings is to communicate effectively and graphically the very real,
scientifically established adverse health consequences of smoking.”)).
248
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221 (alteration in original) (quoting Appellants’ Brief at 47)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
249
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
250
See id. at 47–48.
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question of whether any singular graphic warning
was effective on its own terms. This fundamental
failure, coupled with the Government’s emphasis on
the images’ ability to provoke emotion, strongly
suggests that the Government’s actual purpose is
not to inform, but rather to advocate a change in
consumer behavior. 251
Moreover, the FDA’s reliance on the graphic images—which
“were chosen based on their ability to provoke emotion, a criterion
that does not address whether the graphic images affect
consumers’ knowledge of smoking risks”—coupled with the toll
free number buttresses the conclusion that “the Government’s
actual purpose is to convince consumers that they should ‘QUIT
NOW.’” 252
Despite this evidence, there is disagreement among the Four
Decisions regarding whether the FDA actually articulated two
complementary, but distinct, interests in requiring the graphic
warning labels: (1) an interest in effectively conveying information
about the negative health consequences of smoking to consumers;
and (2) an interest in decreasing smoking rates. 253 Accordingly, in
an abundance of caution, this Note will proceed with its analysis
under the assumption that the FDA articulated both an interest to
educate consumers and to encourage smoking cessation.
It seems clear that the FDA’s interest in educating consumers
on the negative health effects of smoking constitutes a “substantial
interest.” For instance, the Supreme Court held that “there is no
251

Id. (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 29) (citing Defendants’ Opposition at 27–
30); see also Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
252
Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
253
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 n.12 (holding the FDA’s primary interest is to
encourage smoking cessation); id. at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion
holding that the FDA articulated complementary interests in educating the public and
encouraging smoking cessation); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674
F.3d 509, 561–67 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the FDA’s interest is to educate consumers);
id. at 528–29 (Clay, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding the FDA’s interest is to
educate consumers); Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (holding the FDA’s sole interest is
to encourage smoking cessation); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (holding the FDA’s interest is to educate consumers).
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question that [the government’s] interest in ensuring the accuracy
of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial.” 254
However, it seems that the FDA’s interest in encouraging smoking
cessation does not constitute a “substantial interest.” It is true that
the Supreme Court held that “‘tobacco use, particularly among
children and adolescents, poses perhaps the single most significant
threat to public health in the United States,’” 255 and that “the
government has a substantial interest in promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.” 256 However, the Supreme
Court has also held that “where the State’s interest is to
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such
interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such message.” 257
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, there is disagreement
across the Four Decisions regarding whether the FDA’s interests in
educating consumers and encouraging smoking cessation
constitutes a “substantial interests.” 258 In fact, the D.C. Circuit in
Reynolds held that the FDA could not even articulate an interest in
educating consumers as “an interest in ‘effective’ communication
is too vague to stand on its own.” 259 Though this determination is
254
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 164
F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir.1999)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
255
Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161
(2000)).
256
Id. (quoting Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
258
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 n.13 (uncertain as to whether encouraging smoking
cessation is a substantial interest); id. at 1221 (holding FDA cannot articulate a
substantial interest in educating consumers); id. at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(dissenting opinion holding the FDA’s interest in educating consumers is substantial); id.
at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion holding the FDA’s interest in
encouraging smoking cessation is substantial); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United
States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding the
FDA’s interests in encouraging smoking cessation is not substantial).
259
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221. As the circuit stated, “[i]ndeed, the government’s
chosen buzzwords, which it reiterates through the rulemaking, prompt an obvious
question: ‘effective’ in what sense? Allowing [the] FDA to define ‘effectiveness’
however it sees fit would not only render Central Hudson’s ‘substantial interest’
requirement a complete nullity, but it would also eviscerate the requirement that any
restriction ‘directly advance’ that interest.” Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
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irrelevant regarding the Final Rule’s four factual images and nine
textual warnings, as the government need not demonstrate a
“substantial interest” under “rational-basis” review, 260 it is
necessary regarding the Final Rule’s five non-factual images and
the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone number—which are reviewed
under “intermediate scrutiny.” 261 Accordingly, in an abundance of
caution, this Note will proceed with its analysis under the
assumption that the FDA has a “substantial interest” in both
educating consumers and encouraging smoking cessation.
b) Lack of Statistical Evidence Regarding the Final Rule’s
Graphic Images
Even assuming, arguendo, that the FDA articulated a
“substantial interest” in both educating consumers and encouraging
smoking cessation, the Final Rule’s nine graphic images do not
even withstand “rational-basis” review. 262 The FDA has failed to
demonstrate a “rational connection” between the government’s
interests and the means used to achieve those interests, 263 much
less a regulation that directly advances the government’s interest,
as required under “intermediate scrutiny.” 264
As the Reynolds district court stated regarding the FDA’s
interest in educating consumers:
[T]he Government argues that “[t]the most relevant
metric in evaluating the warnings is . . . the extent to
which they more effectively convey information
about health risks to consumers and potential
customers.” Yet it offers no evidence pointing to
the FDA’s attempt to measure improvement in this
area, much less whether the warnings actually
achieved the purported goal of increasing consumer
awareness. Needless to say, generalized scientific
260

See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
261
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
262
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
263
See id.
264
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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literature and the “experiences of countries such as
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom” (none
of which afford First Amendment protections like
those found in our Constitution), say nothing about
the nine graphic images at issue in this case. 265
Furthermore, regarding the FDA’s interest in effecting smoking
cessation, the D.C. Circuit in Reynolds held that:
The FDA makes much of the “international
consensus” surrounding the effectiveness of large
graphic warnings, but offers no evidence showing
that such warnings have [] caused a material
decrease in smoking rates in any of the countries
that now require them. While studies of Canadian
and Australian youth smokers showed that the
warnings on cigarette packs caused a substantial
number of survey participants to think—or think
more—about quitting smoking, and [the] FDA
might be correct that intentions are a “necessary
precursor” to behavior change, it is mere
speculation to suggest that respondents who report
increased thoughts about quitting smoking will
actually follow through on their intentions. And at
no point did these studies attempt to evaluate
whether the increased thoughts about smoking
cessation led participants to actually quit. Another
Australian study reported increased quit attempts by
survey participants after that country enacted large
graphic warnings, but found “no association with
short-term quit success.” Some Canadian and
Australian studies indicated that large graphic
warnings might induce individual smokers to reduce
consumption, or to help persons who have already
quit smoking remain abstinent. But again, the study
did not purport to show that the implementation of

265

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 48
n.21 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Defendants’ Opposition at 23, 24).
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large graphic warnings has actually led to a
reduction in smoking rates. 266
Finally, the D.C. Circuit noted that:
The
FDA’s
Regulatory
Impact
Analysis
(“RIA”) essentially concedes the agency lacks any
evidence showing that the graphic warnings are
likely to reduce smoking rates. One way in which
the RIA analyzed the expected benefits of the Rule
was by comparing the impact of similar warnings
introduced in Canada in 2000. It (1) analyzed the
change in smoking trends in Canada before and
after 2000; (2) assumed any difference in the post2000 change between Canada and the United States
was solely attributable to the introduction of graphic
warnings; and (3) assumed similar warnings would
have an identical impact on U.S. smoking rates.
Describing its approach as “rudimentary,” [the]
FDA acknowledged that apart from differences in
cigarette taxes, the RIA “d[id] not account for
potential confounding variables,” such as the
introduction of more stringent smoking bans and
advertising restrictions in Canada during the
relevant time period, or the fact that Canadian
cigarette prices are generally higher than U.S.
prices . . . [In fact,] [t]he RIA estimated the new
warnings would reduce U.S. smoking rates by a
mere 0.088%, a number the FDA concedes is “in
general not statistically distinguishable from zero.”
Indeed, because it had access to “very small data
sets,” [the] FDA could not even reject the statistical

266

Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,642 (June
22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)); Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524,
69,532 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011))).
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possibility that the Rule would have no impact on
U.S. smoking rates. 267
2. The Final Rule’s Graphic Images and “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” Telephone Number are Unduly Burdensome
None of the Four Decisions assert that requiring textual
warnings on cigarette packages is unduly burdensome. 268 In fact,
requiring textual messages on cigarette packages has been an
acceptable practice since the 1960s. 269 Additionally, the tobacco
companies themselves do not contest replacing the Surgeon
General’s warnings, currently displayed on the sides of cigarette
packages, with any of Congress’s nine new textual warnings. 270
Furthermore, because the textual warnings merely inform
consumers of the negative health consequences of smoking, and do
not seem to actively encourage smokers to quit, 271 the nine textual
warnings do not appear to directly contradict the tobacco
companies’ interest in selling cigarettes. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has held that “the least restrictive means is not the standard;
instead, the case law requires a reasonable fit between the
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends.” 272 Thus, it appears that the textual warnings’ position and
size, and the FDA’s failure to utilize other alternatives, are not
unduly burdensome. 273 Accordingly, it seems that the Final Rule’s
nine textual warnings are constitutional.
267

Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219–20 (citing Final Rule, 76 Fed Reg. at 36,719–20,
36,720–21, 36,755, 36,776; Plaintiffs’ Comment Letter on Proposed Rule (Jan. 11, 2010)
and Statement of Robert S. Maness).
268
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1205; Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674
F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug
Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2011); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United
States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
269
See supra Part I.A.
270
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36,
43 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing the Trial Record at 9:24–25–10:1–3; 15:11–12).
271
See supra Part III.B.i.
272
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
273
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
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However, it is clear that the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone
number is intended to effect smoking cessation. 274 Additionally,
the Final Rule’s nine graphic images seem to “go beyond the
textual warnings to shame and repulse smokers and denigrate
smoking as an antisocial act . . . ‘[B]y effectively shouting . . . that
the risks from smoking outweigh the pleasure that smokers derive
from it, and that smokers make bad personal decisions, and should
stop smoking.’ . . . In effect, the graphic images are not warnings,
but admonitions: ‘[D]on’t buy or use this product.’” 275 This
emotive attack goes beyond merely informing individuals of the
negative health effects of smoking, and takes an active role in
encouraging smoking cessation.
Furthermore, combined, these factors significantly increase the
likelihood that the graphic warnings cross the line from
information to advocacy, where the FDA “has ‘conscript[ed]
[tobacco manufacturers] into an anti-smoking brigade.’” 276
Accordingly, it appears that the nine graphic images and the quitline number directly contradict the tobacco companies’ desired
message at the point of sale—that consumers should purchase
cigarettes—thereby imposing a significant burden on their
protected commercial speech. 277
It is true that the least restrictive means is not necessary for
finding a “reasonable fit” between the FDA’s utilized means and
purported ends to uphold the challenged rule. 278 However, the
Supreme Court held that “if there are numerous and obvious lessburdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech,
that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether
the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.” 279 Thus, it seems
274

See supra Part III.B.i.
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1211–12
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (alterations in original).
276
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36,
49 n.28 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Trial Record at 33:19–20).
277
See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
278
See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 556; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14
(“We reject appellant’s contention that we should subject disclosure requirements to a
strict ‘least restrictive means’ analysis.”).
279
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 523 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
275
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that: (1) the images’ and the quit-line number’s position and size;
(2) the images’ graphic nature; and (3) the FDA’s failure to utilize
other alternatives to both the images and the quit-line number are
unduly burdensome. Accordingly, it appears that the Final Rule’s
nine graphic images and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone
number are unconstitutional even under “rational-basis” review.
a) The Graphic Images’ and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW”
Telephone Number’s Position and Size
The graphic images’ and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” telephone
number’s sheer size and placement requirements alone suggest that
they are unduly burdensome. 280 By requiring that the top fifty
percent of the front and back panels of cigarette packages display
the Final Rule’s warning labels, the tobacco companies are forced
to act as the government’s mouthpiece and disseminate the
government’s anti-smoking message: Do not purchase this
product. 281 These dimensions “alone clearly demonstrate ‘that the
Rule was designed to achieve the very objective articulated by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services: to ‘rebrand[ ] our
cigarette packs,’ treating (as the FDA Commissioner announced
last year) ‘every single pack of cigarettes in our country’ as a
‘mini-billboard.’ A ‘mini-billboard,’ indeed, for its obvious antismoking agenda!’” 282
Instead of requiring that the graphic warnings be displayed on
the top fifty percent of the front and back panels of cigarette
packages, the government could reduce the space appropriated for
410, 417 n.13 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (finding that “‘the availability of alternatives that would
prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections for commercial speech’”
further highlighted the statute’s defects)); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 653 n.15
(analyzing whether the compelled disclosure was unduly burdensome before holding the
regulation reasonably related to the state’s interest under “rational-basis” review).
280
See Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009)) (providing the size and
placement requirements for the warning labels).
281
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F.
Supp. 2d 266, 275–76 (D.D.C. 2011).
282
Id. (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp.
2d 36, 48 n.28 (D.D.C. 2011)) (emphasis in original).
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the warnings to twenty percent of the packaging; alternatively, the
government could require graphic warnings on only the front or
the back of cigarette packaging, not both. 283 Additionally, if the
FDA’s concern is that consumers will not see the warnings if they
are displayed on a smaller scale, the government could instead
enlarge the textual warnings. 284
Furthermore, simply because the Smoking Act directed the
FDA to impose a rule consistent with its provisions regarding size
and position does not mean that the Final Rule will automatically
pass constitutional muster. 285 In fact, as the Reynolds district court
stated, “the parties have conceded, there is no evidence that
Congress even considered the First Amendment implications when
drafting the Smoking Act.” 286 Moreover, as the district court held:
The FDA’s contention that neither it nor this Court
has the authority to second-guess Congress, even if
the congressional mandate violates the First
Amendment, is an oh-too-convenient dodge . . . . To
say the least, implementing a Final Rule consistent
with a congressional mandate does not require a
Court to hold that the Rule automatically passes
constitutional muster. Congress must pass laws,
and the FDA must implement final rules, that are
consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution. 287
b) The Images’ Graphic Nature
It seems clear that utilizing pictorial warnings on cigarette
warning labels serves an important purpose. For instance, pictorial
warnings can stimulate individuals into contemplating the negative
283

See id. at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29–30).
See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1925.
285
See Smoking Act § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009))
(providing the size and placement requirements for the warning labels); Sempeles, supra
note 22, at 244.
286
Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 275–76 (citing Summary Judgment Trial Record
30:10–13 (defendants); 42:3–13 (plaintiffs)).
287
Id. (citing Summary Judgment Trial Record 36:22–25; 37:13–17; Reynolds, 823 F.
Supp. 2d at 48 n.25).
284
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health consequences of smoking to an extent unlike textual
warnings. 288 Additionally, pictorial warnings can caution an
illiterate or non-English speaking audience on the dangers of
cigarettes, information they would be unable to receive through the
mandated English textual warnings. 289
However, there are other less burdensome alternatives to using
pictorial warnings with a graphic component that would still allow
the government to utilize the advantages inherent in pictorial
warnings. Specifically, the government could employ images that
convey only purely factual and uncontroversial information, rather
than those of a graphic nature designed to disgust the consumer. 290
In fact, the Reynolds district court noted that:
[The tobacco companies do not object to
publishing] a graph demonstrating the difficulty of
quitting smoking by showing the correlation
between the number of people who try to quit and
the percentage who actually do . . . [or to
publishing] . . . a “graphic that depicts the types of
harms that befall children if they are exposed to
secondhand smoke or the types of birth defects that
arise, and their likelihood, if mothers smoke during
the course of pregnancy.” 291
Furthermore, the government could utilize bilingual warnings
for non-English speaking citizens, or a picture of the worldrenowned symbol for danger, a skull and crossbones, for illiterate
citizens. 292
288
See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,531–35 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (collecting scientific evidence).
289
See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 563 (6th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted); Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,531; Bennett, supra note 25,
at 1924.
290
See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 30).
291
Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49 (quoting Trial Record at 20:18–21) (citing
Defendants’ Opposition at 22; Trial Record at 20:5–8).
292
See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1924 n.62 (“The symbol of a skull and crossbones is
used by both the United States and the United Nations to symbolize dangerous, toxic, or
hazardous material.”) (citing EPA, PESTICIDES: INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, SKULL AND
CROSSBONES, http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/international/ghs/skull-crossbones.htm (last
visited July 9, 2013)).
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c) Alternatives to Utilizing Graphic Images and the “1–
800–QUIT–NOW” Telephone Number
Even if the FDA eliminated the pictorial warnings’ graphic
nature and altered the images’ and the “1–800–QUIT–NOW”
telephone number’s position and size, there are still other possible
alternatives the government could utilize as a less restrictive means
of conveying the negative health consequences of smoking.
i.
Counter-Speech Informational Campaigns
First, as the Reynolds district court stated, “the Government
could disseminate its anti-smoking message itself, for example, by
increasing its anti-smoking advertisements or issuing additional
statements in the press urging consumers to quit smoking or
both.” 293 Such methods have proven effective in encouraging
smoking cessation. For instance, a decrease in smoking directly
correlated the American Cancer Society’s and other groups’ antismoking campaigns in the 1960s. 294
ii. School-Based Prevention Programs
Second, the government could create more school-based
smoking prevention programs to specifically target and discourage
smoking among adolescents. 295 These programs could directly
influence the youth population by providing them with information
about the potential harms of smoking. 296 In fact, studies have
shown that school-based programs centered on the SocialInfluence-Resistance Model are effective in long-term smoking
prevention among youths. 297
iii. Informational Inserts
Third, the government could utilize informational inserts as
used with other legal products sold in the United States. 298 For
293

Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 28).
See Sempeles, supra note 22, at 248 (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Muzzle Joe
Camel? It May Be Illegal, NEWSDAY, May 30, 1996, at A51).
295
See id.
296
See id.
297
See id. (citing PETER D. JACOBSON ET AL., COMBATING TEEN SMOKING: RESEARCH
AND POLICY STRATEGIES 117–18 (2001)).
298
See id. at 249.
294
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instance, “the government requires information leaflets to be
included within contraceptive packaging.” 299 The government
believes that these informational inserts are an efficient way to
warn the public about the potential health consequences that could
occur from using contraceptives. 300 Similarly, the government
could require that information leaflets describing the dangers of
smoking be included within every cigarette package. 301
iv.
Banning Public Smoking
Fourth, the government could encourage municipalities and
states to follow cities in Maine, Texas, Oregon, New York, and
Michigan, and ban tobacco use in public places. 302 Banning
smoking in public places has proven effective overseas in
encouraging smoking cessation. 303 For instance, a London ban on
public smoking encouraged over 400,000 London smokers to
quit. 304
v.
Increasing Cigarette Taxes
Fifth, the FDA could lobby for increased federal taxes on
tobacco products and encourage states to tax tobacco products at a

299

Id. (citing Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tenn.
1977)).
300
See id. at 249 n.223 (“The case held that, as a matter of law, a leaflet contained in
each birth control pill dispenser was an adequate warning given by the drug
manufacturer.”) (citing Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D.
Tenn. 1977)).
301
See id.
302
See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1936 (citing Katharine Q. Seelye, Increasingly,
Smoking Indoors Is Forbidden at Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at
A25, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/us/public-housing-authoritiesincreasingly-ban-indoor-smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Report: Ban Smoking in
Public Places, Surgeon General says 126 Million Nonsmokers Exposed to Tobacco
Hazards, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 27, 2006, 4:11 PM), available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13569976/ns/health-addictions/t/report-ban-smokingpublicplaces).
303
See id.
304
See id. (citing Smoking Bans Spurs 400,000 People to Quit the Habit, DAILY MAIL
REP. (July 4, 2008, 4:23 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/
Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html).
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higher rate. 305 According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, “‘a 10% increase in price [alone] . . . [would] reduce
overall cigarette consumption among adolescents and young adults
by about 4%.’” 306 Although, as the Liquormart Court discussed,
severe addicts may not be affected by a “‘marginal price increase’
on tobacco products and instead choose to forego necessities to
feed their habit,” 307 this method may deter less-addicted
individuals from smoking.
vi.
Increased Penalties Surrounding Underage Tobacco
Use
Finally, the FDA could encourage stricter federal and state
statutory penalties for the sale of tobacco products to underage
individuals. 308 Additionally, increasing the enforcement of current
state laws that prohibit the sale of tobacco products to minors and
criminalizing the possession, not just use, of tobacco products for
minors may also prove effective. 309 As the Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids states, “‘strong enforcement of youth access
laws [has] substantially reduced illegal sales to minors’ in many
states already, including California and Massachusetts.” 310
CONCLUSION
Assuming the role of surrogate parent, the FDA wishes to teach
us that the antitheses to the old adage “an apple a day keeps the
305

See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 845 F.
Supp. 2d 266, 276 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29); Bennett, supra note
25, at 1934.
306
Bennett, supra note 25, at 1935 (quoting Smoking & Tobacco Use: Economic Facts
About U.S. Tobacco Production and Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/
economics/econ_facts).
307
Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 506 (1996)).
308
See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29); Bennett,
supra note 25, at 1938.
309
See Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion at 29); Sempeles,
supra note 22, at 248.
310
See Bennett, supra note 25, at 1939 (quoting Jessica Guilfoyle, Enforcing Laws
Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Kids Reduces Youth Smoking, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO
FREE KIDS (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/
pdf/0049.pdf).
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doctor away” is “a pack a day and the doctor will stay to treat your
lung cancer, emphysema, stroke, and heart disease.” 311 As
children, our parents force us to eat our vegetables so we can grow
up strong and healthy. As youths and adults, the FDA is
employing graphic images to “shock” us into quitting smoking so
we can remain healthy. However, in the spirit of challenging
authority, courts must join the rebellious teenager within us in
sarcastically retorting OMG, FDA, TMI. 312
The Final Rule’s requirements regarding its images’ graphic
nature, position, and size, as well as the “1–800–QUIT–NOW”
telephone number’s position and size, provide “too much
information” and are unduly burdensome. Furthermore, the Final
Rule’s graphic images also fail to advance the FDA’s interest in
encouraging smoking cessation. Thus, except for its textual
warnings, the Final Rule’s nine graphic warning labels fail to
withstand all three constitutional standards of review.
However, like all parents, the FDA refuses to “just leave us
alone.” Instead, the FDA intends to modify its graphic cigarette
warning labels, perhaps presaging its regulating alcohol and
McDonald’s “Big Mac” hamburgers. Accordingly, prospective
courts must ensure that the FDA’s redesigned warning labels
accord with the principles set forth, above, in Part III.B.2 of this
Note. Otherwise, unless courts curtail the FDA’s “parental rights”
to make our personal choices for us, the FDA, drunk with power, is
likely to continue ordering “graphic warning labels all around.”

311

See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,527–29 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011) (collecting scientific evidence).
312
See Definition of TMI in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2013),
http://oxfordictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/TMI
(“TMI”
is
the
abbreviation for “Too Much Information.”); Definition of OMG in English, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES (2013), http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/OMG
?q=omg (“OMG” is the abbreviation for “Oh My G-d”); supra text accompanying note
17 (“FDA” has been defined above as the “Federal Drug Administration”).

